Understanding the mechanics of the European Enforcement Order (EEO) for uncontested claims is vital for effective cross-border debt enforcement within the EU. Recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have clarified certain intricacies of the EEO procedure established by Regulation (EC) 805/2004 (hereinafter the “EEO Regulation”), which is directly applicable in all EU Member States.

This article analyses certain judicial clarifications regarding the roles and limits of the Member State courts developed in the very recent judgment of Manuel Costa Filhos Lda v OÜ Wine Port of Paldiski (C-643/24) delivered on the 27^th November 2025, in the context of earlier decisions in the names Lufthansa Technik v Arik Air Limited and others (C-393/21), and Collect Inkasso and others v Rain Aint and others (C-289/17).

The central question in C-643/24 concerned the capacity of enforcement courts to review alleged procedural defects in the EEO certificate, specifically regarding service requirements under Regulation No 1393/2007 (hereinafter the “Service Regulation”). The Portuguese debtor opposed enforcement on the basis that the document instituting proceedings in Estonia was not served in a language he understood and lacked the mandatory form. The CJEU answered decisively that Article 20(1) of the EEO Regulation precludes enforcement courts from examining whether the minimum standards set out in Chapter III were respected in the state of origin.

The judgment reaffirmed the strict jurisdictional boundary namely that the enforcement courts’ remit is limited to the grounds listed in Articles 21 and 23 – irreconcilability with an earlier judgment, or the existence of “exceptional circumstances” justifying stay or limitation. Examination of certification validity or compliance with service and procedural safeguards falls squarely and exclusively with the court of origin. The Court stated unambiguously:

“Certification of a judgment… falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin.”¹.

As a result, any contestation that the EEO certificate was wrongly granted owing to procedural irregularities – such as defective service or lack of essential information – must be advanced before the origin court, not litigated as a ground for refusal in the state of enforcement. This ruling is rooted in the foundational concept of mutual trust, which underpins the entire EEO framework. Undermining this trust with a substantive review in the enforcement forum would disrupt the EEO Regulation’s goal of efficiency and unimpeded cross-border execution.

The role of the enforcement court in safeguarding debtor rights is tightly circumscribed, as clarified in Lufthansa Technik. Here, following a German EEO issued for an uncontested claim, the debtor sought both a withdrawal of the EEO certificate in Germany and a stay of enforcement in Lithuania. The CJEU clarified that while enforcement courts may stay proceedings under Article 23(c) if “exceptional circumstances” exist, such circumstances must be interpreted restrictively.

Critically, and consistently with the decision in Manuel Costa Filho, the CJEU in Lufthansa Technik delineated that the assessment of whether a certificate has been “wrongly granted” (Article 10) is a matter for the origin court alone. The enforcement court can ensure the debtor does not suffer irreparable harm pending a challenge in the court of origin but cannot assess the underlying merits of that challenge. The judgment explains:

“[…] the need for a strict interpretation of the concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is supported by a teleological interpretation of Article 23(c) […]”​

The function of the enforcement court is therefore procedural and protective, not substantive. Any doubts or claims concerning the rectification or withdrawal of the European enforcement order certificate must be brought before the certifying court, reaffirming the principle that only the court of origin is empowered to scrutinise compliance with procedural guarantees.

Collect Inkasso underscores the substantial responsibilities placed on the court of origin, regarding procedural safeguards. Collect Inkasso obtained Estonian payment orders against several debtors who had not objected in simplified order for payment procedures, so the claims were treated as uncontested. Those creditors later applied to the Estonian court for certification of the orders as EEOs, but the court refused because neither the documents instituting proceedings nor the orders indicated the address of the competent court.

The creditors challenged these refusals, and the Estonian court referred questions to the CJEU on whether omission of the court’s address is compatible with Articles 17(a) and 18(1)(b) of Regulation 805/2004. The CJEU held that a judgment cannot be certified as an EEO if the debtor was not informed of the address of the court for responding or appealing, an omission that breaches EEO Regulation requirements.

The decision interprets Article 18 on curing non-compliance with minimum standards: the cure must be made prior to certification. “Retrospective” validation after certification is not permissible. The judgment confirms:

“[A] court judgment delivered without the debtor having been informed of the address of the court to which to respond or before which to appear […] cannot be certified as a European Enforcement Order.”​

Importantly, Collect Inkasso illustrates the systemic balance struck by the EEO Regulation: swift and automatic enforcement for uncontested claims is anchored in strict application of debtor safeguards by the court of origin. Enforcement courts are expressly denied the competence to revisit procedural compliance, ensuring that any protection for the debtor must be woven into the original proceedings, not via ex post facto objections.

This CJEU case law crystalises three cardinal elements in the EEO procedure:

1. The enforcement court’s jurisdiction under the EEO Regulation is strictly limited to the grounds for refusal, stay, or limitation explicitly enumerated in articles 21-23 of the EEO Regulation. There is an absolute bar on substantive review of certification or procedural standards compliance in the enforcement state.​
2. Exclusive competence over certification validity including service, information to debtor, and minimum standards, vests solely in the originating court. Therefore, all such challenges must be raised in the Member State of origin.​
3. Certification prerequisites, particularly the debtor’s right to information regarding steps to contest the claim, must be meticulously observed by the court of origin, with Article 18 only permitting a “cure” prior to certification.​

The system achieves “a balance between swift enforcement and protection of debtor rights” but this balance can only be maintained if origin courts discharge their procedural responsibilities rigorously.​

The abolition of an exequatur procedure as a pre-requisite to enforcement under the EEO Regulation presents significant opportunities for efficient cross-border enforcement of uncontested claims, but places heightened demands on the accuracy and integrity of the originating court’s procedural observance. The enforcing court is rendered a facilitator of execution, rather than a gatekeeper, with its powers limited to specific procedural grounds.

The modern application of the EEO regime, especially post-Manuel Costa Filhos Lda, now rests more than ever on the rigorous conduct of proceedings at source. Particular care should therefore be devoted to compliance with the procedural standards in the originating jurisdiction, understanding that any omission can only be remedied before certification, not in the context of enforcement abroad.

¹Paragraph 61